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JURY MISCONDUCT, JURY INTERVIEWS, AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: IS
THE BROAD EXCLUSIONARY
PRINCIPLE OF RULE 606(b)
JUSTIFIED?
SUSAN CRUMP t
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) incorporates the long-established
policy of protecting the secrecy ofjury deliberations. The Rule excludes
the testimony ofjurors concerning matters or statements arising in jury
deliberations and concerning the effects of any influences upon jurors'
minds in connection with a verdict or indictment. This exclusionary
rule in 606(b) is excepted when testimony concerns any "extraneous
prejudicial information" or "outside influence" brought before a jury.
In this Article Professor Crump argues that the current structure of Rule
606(b) and the local rules in federal courts regulating jury interviews do
not reflect a harmonized approach to the policy objectives which the rules
purport to serve. Specifically, Professor Crump calls for a modest revi-
sion of Rule 606(b), complemented by a uniform rule governing jury
interviews. This revised Rule 606(b) would retain the principle objectives
of the old Rule, but would abandon the catchphrases "extraneous" and
"outside," which often have steered courts down the path to "occasional
injustice."
INTRODUCTION
According to juror Daniel Hardy, the jury that convicted Anthony Tanner
of federal conspiracy1 and mail fraud 2 had been "'on one big party.' "3 He and
three other jurors had consumed among them as many as three pitchers of beer
during several of the noon recesses. Two other members frequently drank mixed
drinks at lunch. Still another, whom Hardy described as an "alcoholic," drank a
liter of wine with lunch on three different occasions. Hardy also confessed that
he and three other jurors had "smoked marijuana quite regularly during the
trial." Moreover, he had observed one juror take cocaine five times during the
trial, and another take it two or three times. One juror allegedly sold marijuana
to another juror during the trial and took marijuana, cocaine, and drug para-
phernalia into the courthouse. Not surprisingly, some of the jurors fell asleep
t Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. A.B. 1968, University of California, Davis;
J.D. 1974, University of Houston.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
2. Id. § 1341.
3. Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2745 (1987) (quoting Record on Appeal at 209,
Tanner (No. 86-177)).
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during presentation of the evidence. 4
Hardy's information came to light because he contacted Tanner's attorney
"'to clear [his] conscience.' -5 Tanner's attorney, acting in arguable defiance of
a court order 6 and local rules,7 promptly asked two private investigators to take
a sworn statement from Hardy and attached it to a motion for a new trial.8
Hardy's revelations did not necessarily warrant the setting aside of the verdict,
because the governing standards quite properly are restrictive. It would have
been understandable, however, if Tanner's attorney had expected that these lu-
rid allegations would capture the judge's full attention.
The district court overruled the motion without hearing any evidence. The
court reasoned that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prevented jurors in
Hardy's circumstances from testifying against their own verdicts.9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this holding.10 Ulti-
mately, the United States Supreme Court also affirmed, in an opinion that can-
didly recited the facts in Hardy's affidavit substantially as they appear above.II
The resulting decision, Tanner v. United States 12 is a fascinating illustration of
the ambiguous policies, unresolved conflicts, and potential for anomalous out-
comes concealed in the ostensibly clear language of the evidentiary rule that
excluded Daniel Hardy's testimony.
In its historical context, the Tanner decision is less surprising than it ini-
tially appears. From the time of Lord Mansfield until the present, courts and
legislatures have zealously protected the secrecy of jury deliberations, even at
the occasional expense of injustice to litigants. For example, the current codifi-
cation of this principle, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), deems incompetent the
testimony of jurors as to instances of misconduct, unless that testimony pertains
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting Record on Appeal at 231, Tanner (No. 86-177)).
6. Tanner's attorney, David Best, previously had filed a motion for a new trial based on the
affidavit ofjuror Vera Ashbul. Her affidavit alleged that several of the jurors in Tanner's trial slept
during the afternoons after having drunk alcohol with their lunch. At the hearing on this motion,
the trial judge ruled that Ashbul's testimony, as well as testimony from any juror attempting to
impeach the verdict, was incompetent under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Id. at 2744. The
judge did, however, hear testimony from Best, who stated that on one occasion he noticed a juror
was in a "'giggly mood'" during the trial. Id. (quoting Record on Appeal at 170, Tanner (No. 86-
177)). Thejudge also noted there had been a short conversation on the record at trial between him
and one of Tanner's trial attorneys concerning whether or not jurors were sleeping during the evi-
dence, but that this conversation was inconclusive. Based on lack of evidence, the judge overruled
Tanner's first motion for a new trial and prohibited Tanner's attorneys from interviewing other
jurors in an attempt to establish jury misconduct. Id.
7. The local rules for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
where the Tanner case was tried, adopt the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (now the Model Code of Professional Responsibility), which prohibits lawyers from in-
terviewing jurors in any manner calculated to "harass" or "embarrass" jurors or their family
members, or "influence their actions in future jury service." U.S. DIsT. Cr. N.D. FLA. R. 4(k)(l);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) (1980).
8. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2745.
9. Id. at 2744.
10. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765, 770 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Tanner v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (1987).
11. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2744-45.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).
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either to extraneous prejudicial information that was improperly brought to the
jury's attention during the trial, or to improper outside influences brought to
bear upon any juror. 13 Under this rule, if a juror were to misunderstand the
court's instructions, 14 yield to coercion from other jurors in reaching a verdict, 15
or even render a quotient verdict, 16 his testimony establishing this misconduct
would be deemed incompetent and excluded from consideration. These and
similar instances of juror misconduct are shielded from inquiry after the verdict
because of substantial public policy concerns for protecting the jury system. In
addition, local court rules frequently restrict losing litigants from gathering in-
formation concerning misconduct from jurors. 17 Many local rules grant the
trial court authority to require litigants to show "good cause" before receiving
permission to interview jurors.18 Other rules prohibit lawyers or parties from
contacting jurors in a manner calculated to harass them or their families.19
13. Rule 606(b) provides:
Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a ver-
dict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during
the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or to dissent from the verdict
or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except
that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying
be received for these purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
14. See Scogin v. Century Fitness, Inc., 780 F.2d 1316, 1320 (8th Cir. 1985) (evidence that
verdict did not reflect intent of jury to award plaintiff a portion of damages in comparative negli-
gence case considered incompetent); Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 634 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd mem., 806 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1986) (evidence that jurors thought they were awarding a
verdict to plaintiff in answering special interrogatories held to be incompetent).
15. See Jacobson v. Henderson, 765 F.2d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1985) (allegations that "screaming,
hysterical crying, fist banging, name calling, and... obscene language" was heard in the jury room
during deliberations held to be incompetent evidence); United States v. Gerardi, 586 F.2d 896 (1st
Cir. 1978) (allegation that a juror was persuaded by other jurors to vote for guilt held to be incompe-
tent evidence).
16. A quotient verdict is one in which jurors determine damages in a case by adding together
the amounts each juror thinks is appropriate and dividing the sum by the number of jurors deciding
the case. See Comment, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors-Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 417, 419-20 n.20 (1978). Most courts refuse to admit evidence of quotient ver-
dicts, a decision which the history of Rule 606(b) supports. See Scogin, 780 F.2d at 1318 (bystander's
affidavit stating jury foreperson told him that jury had awarded damages by using a quotient verdict
held to be incompetent proof); Mueller, Jurors'Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal
Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NaB. L. REv. 920, 940 n.86 (1978); Comment, Impeachment of Jury
Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. Rav. 360, 371 (1958). But cf. United States v. 4,925 Acres of Land, 143
F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1944) (reversing a case in which judge instructed jury to use quotient method
to arrive at a verdict, but commenting that many cases permit such a verdict to stand if method was
initiated by jury, and jury approved of result independently).
17. See, eg., U.S. DIsT. CT. E.D. Tax. R. 10(b) ("After a verdict is rendered but before the
jury is discharged from further duty, an attorney may obtain leave of the Judge before whom the
action was tried to converse with members of the jury."); cf. U.S. DIsT. CT. M.D.N.C. R. 112(b)(4)
(communication with petit jurors permitted as long as the communication does not tend to "harass,
humiliate, or intimidate" the juror).
18. See, eg., U.S. DisT. CT. E.D. Mo. R. 16(D) ("No attorney or any party to an action [or
their representatives] shall... interview, examine, or question any petit juror.., except on leave of
court granted upon good cause shown.").
19. For example, the rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina provide:
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The substantial policy considerations that underlie Rule 606 (b) include en-
couraging the finality of jury verdicts, conserving judicial resources by foreclos-
ing lengthy adversary hearings on marginal claims of misconduct, and
preserving the dignity of the court.20 Rule 606(b) also encourages free and
frank discussions inside the jury room, reduces juror harassment, and prevents
minority jurors from agreeing to the verdict only to challenge it at a later time.21
There are, however, substantial countervailing policies. These policies favor in-
quiry into truth, the appearance of fairness to litigants, and public respect for the
courts. 2 2 The tension among these policies and the different balances that courts
and legislatures have struck have led to results that not only are remarkably
inconsistent, but occasionally give the appearance of unfairness.
This Article examines the justifications for these restrictions, the arguments
against them, and the alternatives. Part I of the Article analyzes Rule 606(b)
and its common law antecedents in terms of policy considerations and illustra-
tive examples. Part II of the Article categorizes the more extensive restrictions
local federal rules have placed on obtaining information concerning jury miscon-
duct from jurors themselves. These local rules tend not to be formulated and
enforced uniformly, but they supplement and enhance the effects of Rule 606(b).
Part III examines whether the policy reasons behind each of these restrictions
are justified, and whether other competing interests, as yet unconsidered in the
general literature, should require a reformulation of Rule 606(b). Finally, the
Article reviews and analyzes some of the alternative proposals in light of these
competing interests. The Article concludes that the policies underlying Rule
606(b) are valid and important. However, a broad exclusionary principle, such
[N]o attorney or party litigant shall... ask questions of or make comments to a member of
that jury or members of the family of such a juror that are calculated merely to harass or
embarrass such a juror or a member of such juror's family or to influence the actions of
such a juror or a member of such juror's family in future jury service.
U.S. DisT. Cr. E.D.N.C. R. 6.03; see also U.S. DIST Cr. M.D.N.C. R. 112(b)(1) (no communication
with jurors permitted "which may reasonably have the effect of influencing" the juror).
20. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The Rule was designed
both to protect the judicial process from efforts to undermine verdicts by pointing to jurors' thoughts
and deliberations and to protect the jurors from being pestered by lawyers."); Jorgensen v. York Ice
Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.) (unrestricted attacks would place judges in,the position of
"Penelopes, forever engaged in unraveling the webs they wove"), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 68 (3d ed. 1984); Carlson & Sumberg,
Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 250-51.
21. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-69 (1915); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140,
148 (1892); Schwartz, 787 F.2d at 262; Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977); People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 348, 455 P.2d 132, 136, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 196, 200, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969). In fact, these policies may justify the holding in
Tanner because there was no showing that the alleged misconduct had any serious effect on thejury's deliberations. Juror Hardy explicitly stated that he and some of his fellow jurors avoided
intoxication: "[A]s far as being drunk, no we wasn't." Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750.
22. See Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule ofEvidence 606(b)
and the ConstitutionalRight o a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1195-96 (1985). A broad exclusionary
principle, such as that of Rule 606(b), may impose significant costs. In Tanner's case, the effect of
Rule 606(b) was not limited to preventing the motion from succeeding; instead, it prevented defend-
ant from fully presenting the issue of misconduct. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2741. Furthermore, appli-
cable rules and orders prevented Tanner's attorneys from interviewing jurors to find circumstances
that might ripen the evidence of misconduct into admissible, and perhaps even sufficient, proof. Id.
at 2744-45.
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as that imposed by Rule 606(b), is inferior to a more narrowly targeted exclu-
sionary rule, which could be coupled with rules that prevent juror harassment
and instability of verdicts.
I. RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED: JURORS AS
INCOMPETENT WITNESSES OF THEIR OWN MISCONDUCT
A. The Common Law Development
1. The Mansfield Rule's Focus on the Untrustworthy Nature of a Juror
Repudiating His Verdict
The rule preventing jurors from testifying about misconduct occurring in-
side the jury room initially was stated in 1787 by Lord Mansfield in the English
case of Vaise v. Delaval.23 The jurors in Vaise allegedly "tossed up" to deter-
mine their verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Lord Mansfield, drawing from other
instances in which witnesses had been considered incompetent, held that jurors
should not be permitted to testify as to matters involving their own miscon-
duct.24 Prior to Vaise, jurors routinely had been permitted to give affidavits as
to misconduct, and there was no limit on the type of proof a court could enter-
tain in determining whether a new trial was proper on that basis.25
The policy behind the Mansfield Rule was simple. If ajuror during deliber-
ations engaged in wrongful conduct, his subsequent testimony was considered
untrustworthy. Courts applying the Mansfield Rule reasoned that a person who
testified to his own misconduct in a judicial proceeding would be unreliable in
testifying about the wrongdoing.26 The same common law rationale previously
had been applied to witnesses who retracted perjured testimony2 7 or invalidated
their own instruments, 28 to accomplices who testified in criminal cases,2 9 and to
married men who attempted to disclaim paternity on grounds of nonaccess in
illegitimacy cases.30 Common-law judges inferred reasons why such witnesses
might in some instances be unreliable and then, with characteristic draconian
23. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
24. Id. at 944. This was known at common law as the doctrine that a "witness shall not be
heard to allege his own turpitude: 'nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur.'" 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2352, at 696 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
25. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2352, at 696; see, e.g., Norman v. Beaumont, 94 Eng. Rep.
1000 (K.B. 1744) (verdict arrived at by 11 jurors set aside); Philips v. Fowler, 92 Eng. Rep. 1190
(K.B. 1735) (verdict obtained by casting lots set aside).
26. "The notion underlying the maxim is that a person who comes upon the stand to testify
that he has at a former time spoken falsely or acted corruptly is by his very confession a liar or a
villain, and therefore untrustworthy as a witness." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 525, at 735
(Chadbourn rev. 1979).
27. Id. § 527, at 737 ("self-confessed perjurer incapable of trust").
28. Id. § 529, at 739-40 (a person invalidating his own instrument is disqualified by reason of
his interest); see Walton v. Shelley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1104, 1105 (K.B. 1786).
29. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 526, at 736 (confession of crime by accomplice acknowl-
edges accomplice's turpitude and renders him incompetent and untrustworthy).
30. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2063, at 469-73 (Chadboum rev. 1978). A related doctrine,
also developed by Lord Mansfield, prevented parties from repudiating a "marriage in fact." See id.
§ 2084, at 559-62.
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efficiency, simply excluded this testimony in all cases by declaring them
incompetent.
As a rule of juror competency, the principle announced in Vaise did not
directly affect the definition ofjury misconduct, the grounds for new trial, or the
availability of proof from other sources. 31 For example, dicta in Vaise suggested
that if a bailiff were to view jurors deciding an issue by chance, the bailiff's
testimony not only would be competent, but probably would be sufficient to
require a new trial as well.32 This reasoning led to the common-law view that
inquiry into jury misconduct stops at the jury room door.
The Mansfield Rule was subject to criticism because it meant that proof of
an incident of serious misconduct, even if such an incident clearly occurred,
might depend on the accidental presence of an eavesdropper. 33 Furthermore,
the reasoning used to support this rule did not protect any independent policy
objective, such as a concern about delving too deeply into the mental processes
by which jurors reach a decision, or concerns about juror privacy, harassment,
or finality to litigation. Instead, the reasoning automatically imputed unreliabil-
ity to the testimony by which misconduct was proved, even if the testimony in
fact was reliable.
Had the sole concern of courts applying the Mansfield Rule been the un-
trustworthy nature of the recanting juror's testimony, the Rule probably would
have died a natural death, as did other incompetency rules.34 After all, jurors
often may be more reliable sources of information about their own misconduct
than eavesdroppers. Furthermore, it is internally inconsistent to permit an
eavesdropper to testify when the eavesdropper himself is a probable wrongdoer.
However, the Mansfield Rule was buoyed up by other policy reasons of a
sounder nature, which eventually forced a redefinition of the Rule when it was
imported into the United States.
2. Liberalization of the Mansfield Rule by the States
The Mansfield Rule initially was accepted in the United States as the basic
rule for determining the incompetency of juror affidavits regarding jury miscon-
duct. 35 By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, two separate but re-
lated departures from the Rule gained adherence.
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2353, at 697-701.
32. Paise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944; see Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211-12
(1866).
33. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2353, at 698-99. Wigmore also points out that the Mans-
field Rule's admission of nonjuror testimony might "tempt the parties to seduce the bailiffs to tricky
expedients and surreptitious eavesdroppings .... " Id. § 2353, at 699.
34. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2353, at 696.
The doctrine prohibiting a husband or wife from testifying about nonaccess in paternity cases was
followed to some extent in the United States. Compare McKenzie v. Harris, 679 F.2d 8, 12 (3d Cir.
1982) (spouses incompetent to testify as to nonaccess) and Leonard v. Leonard, 360 So. 2d 710, 713
(Ala. 1978) (spouses are incompetent to testify as to nonaccess but may testify as to circumstances
from which nonaccess may be inferred) with Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1098, 266 S.E.2d 104,
106 (1980) (no longer the rule that spouse is prohibited from testifying about nonaccess).
35. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2746; McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915); Jorgensen v.
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Perhaps the most important redefinition of the Mansfield Rule came in the
1866 case of Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph CO.,36 which involved a
quotient verdict. The Iowa Supreme Court, after carefully analyzing prior case
law, determined that there was no "fixed principle" by which such cases had
been decided;37 nor was the court comfortable in fashioning one. 38 Nonetheless,
the court felt compelled to create its own principle of broad admissibility and
held that "affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a
verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room which
does not essentially inhere in the verdict. .... ,,39
In devising this test, the Wright court primarily was concerned with pro-
tecting the "sanctity and conclusiveness" of jury verdicts from parties and their
attorneys who would attempt to influence them.4° If the court had permitted
jurors to testify as to matters about which they had exclusive knowledge, this
would have created an incentive for parties and attorneys to pressure jurors into
testifying contrary to the verdict, because such testimony could only be refuted
with difficulty.4 1 It would be relatively easy to influence a juror to testify that he
misunderstood the charge or had reservations about the verdict; proof of such
matters would rest primarily within the conscience of that juror alone.4 2 Thus,
the Wright court attempted to fashion a test that would require objective, verifi-
able proof of misconduct to prevent attacks on the verdict at the whim of a
minority juror.
The Wright court equally favored a policy of exposing jurors who failed to
perform their duties correctly whenever objective evidence revealed they had
acted in violation of the law. To suppress the ability of the trial court to seek the
truth in such instances would not only deny the losing litigant individual justice,
but also could undermine public confidence in the jury system.43 After balanc-
ing these policies, the court concluded that quotient verdicts were not matters
essentially inhering within the conscience of an individual juror and were objec-
tively verifiable; further, affidavits concerning the receipt of quotient verdicts
York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 606[03], at 606-22 (1987).
36. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
37. Id. at 209.
38. The court explained, "While we do not feel entirely confident of its correctness, nor state it
without considerable hesitation .... we are not without that assurance, which, under the circum-
stances, justifies us in laying down... [a] true rule." Id. at 210.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 211.
41. See id.
42. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 1221. Thompson observes:
Jurors may make accommodation reluctantly and perhaps once free from the isolation and
pressures of the jury room, they develop second thoughts about their accommodations and
compromises. Such a juror might easily be influenced by counsel to testify that certain
evidence improperly admitted, or other improper circumstances, influenced his or her deci-
sion to assent to the verdict. The finality of jury verdicts can be undermined if their valid-
ity can be easily destroyed by such testimony.
Id.
43. See Wright, 20 Iowa at 211.
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were competent evidence. 44
The Iowa Rule, as this holding soon was called, attracted numerous adher-
ents. One adherent was the Supreme Court of Kansas which, in the 1874 case of
Perry v. Bailey,45 considered the competency of a juror affidavit alleging that a
fellow juror was drunk and abusive during deliberations. Citing the rule in
Wright 46 with approval, the court determined that a juror's affidavit detailing
the drunken and abusive state of another juror during deliberations was a matter
that was objectively verifiable and did not rest solely within his conscience.
Therefore, the affidavit contained competent testimony.4 7 The court also ap-
proved the listing in Wright 48 of the types of allegations that would qualify as
"inhering in the verdict" and those that would not.49 For example, the Perry
court proposed that a juror's ignorance about the law or facts in the case, and his
subsequent statements that he was improperly influenced by other jurors or that
he in reality did not agree with the verdict, would inhere in the verdict and be
incompetent evidence on a motion for new trial.50 However, if a juror could
show that he was approached ex parte by a third party in the case, or that the
verdict was determined by an illegal procedure, his testimony about these mat-
ters would be competent.51
The second related American departure from the Mansfield Rule occurred
in Woodward v. Leavitt,52 which focused on the difference between extraneous
influences and the effect those extraneous influences had upon a juror's thought
process.5 3 Using this test, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
competent a juror's affidavit refuting a statement made by other witnesses,
which alleged the juror had expressed an opinion before trial about the correct-
ness of defendant's legal position.5 4 The court, however, deemed incompetent
the portion of the juror's affidavit which discussed deliberations and how the
44. In so holding, the Wright court disapproved of the Mansfield Rule's distinction between
affidavits from nonjurors, which had been deemed competent evidence under the Rule, and affidavits
of the jurors themselves, which were deemed incompetent. The court concluded that, if anything,
jurors should be more accurate witnesses to their own misconduct than a spy. Id. at 211-12.
45. 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
46. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210 ("affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a
verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially
inhere in the verdict").
47. Perry, 12 Kan. at 544-45.
48. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210.
49. Perry, 12 Kan. at 544.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Iowa Rule slowly gathered support in the United States and by 1969 had been
adopted by at least a dozen jurisdictions: Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal district courts. 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2354, at 702 n.l. By 1987, four of these states had abandoned the
Iowa Rule to follow the approach of Rule 606(b). See N.D. R. EVID. 606(b); OHIO EVID. R.
606(B) (adding requirement that outside evidence of misconduct must be presented before a juror is
allowed to testify, unless conduct involves a threat, bribe, or impropriety of a court official); TEX. R.
EvID. 606(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.06(2) (West 1975). The Model Rules of Evidence and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence also were patterned after the Iowa Rule. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
R. 301 (1942); UNIF. R. OF EVID. 41 (1953).
52. 107 Mass. 453 (1871).
53. Id. at 466.
54. There apparently had been several trials of the lawsuit, and the case frequently had been
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juror himself voted. 55 The court in Woodward arrived at its decision by empha-
sizing that juror deliberations should be free and secret to avoid "distrust, em-
barrassment and uncertainty" in the verdict.
56
3. The Federal Courts Interpret the Mansfield Rule: A History of
Inconsistent Standards
The United States Supreme Court exhibited an early reluctance to abide by
the harsh absoluteness of the Mansfield Rule. In the first significant federal case
to consider the issue, United States v. Reid,57 the Court was confronted with
affidavits from two jurors in a murder case. The affidavits indicated that the
jurors had read newspaper accounts of the trial prior to reaching a verdict. The
jurors stated in their affidavits that these accounts had not influenced their deci-
sions. The Court refused to determine whether these affidavits were competent
testimony. Instead, it held that the newspaper articles would not have influ-
enced a reasonable person's decision in the case, and that the juror's affidavits
did not demonstrate harm.5 8 Consequently, no new trial was required.
The Reid Court cited no authority for its decision, stated no general rule to
follow, and analyzed no policy considerations. It merely advised that such affi-
davits should be "received with great caution," and that "cases might arise in
which it would be impossible to refuse them without violating the plainest prin-
ciples of justice."'59 It is difficult to read this case without surmising that the
litigants' briefs vigorously argued the adoption or modification of the Mansfield
Rule, and the Court simply evaded the issue.60
In the next major Supreme Court case to consider the issue, Mattox v.
United States,61 the petitioner asked the Court to deem competent affidavits
from jurors in a capital case which alleged two types of juror misconduct. First,
the affidavits alleged that the bailiff had informed the jury that the petitioner
previously had killed two other victims. Second, the affidavits alleged that mem-
bers of the jury had read newspaper accounts of the trial during deliberations.
The accounts suggested that the evidence against petitioner was strong and that
he previously had been found guilty of murder.62
discussed by members of the town, including the juror himself. Three persons testified that the juror
publicly had stated he believed defendant "was on the catch." Id. at 459.
55. Id. at 471.
56. Id. at 460.
57. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
58. Id. at 366 ("There was nothing in the newspapers calculated to influence [thejurors'] deci-
sion, and both of them swear that these papers had not the slightest influence on their verdict."). It
is somewhat surprising that the Court based its decision in part on statements in the juror affidavits
which claimed that the verdict was not influenced by a consideration of these articles. Courts prior
and subsequent to Reid have found it improper to consider affidavits of jurors that reveal those
jurors' thought processes. See, e.g., Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-11 (1866);
Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 462 (1871); Whitney v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405, 405 (1809).
59. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 366.
60. The Court claimed that it was "unnecessary to ... examine the decisions referred to in the
argument." Id.
61. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
62. Id. at 142-44.
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In determining the competency of these affidavits, the Court cited with ap-
proval Perry, the Kansas Supreme Court case that had adopted the Iowa Rule
and the "inhere in the verdict" test.63 The Court also approved the "extraneous
influence" test adopted in Woodward.64 Although both tests shielded from scru-
tiny matters requiring inquiry into the thought processes of jurors, the two were
not identical.65 The Woodward test was more exclusive. It not only protected
juror thought processes and deliberations, but also tended to protect the method
by which jurors were induced to arrive at a verdict, because evidence of such
methods would require testimony disclosing jury discussions. 6 Thus, unlike
Perry or Wright, Woodward probably would exclude evidence of a quotient ver-
dict or agreement to abide by a majority verdict.67 Nonetheless, because the
affidavits in Mattox were competent under either a Perry or Woodward analysis,
the Supreme Court held that they should have been considered by the trial court
in determining the motion for a new trial. The analysis in Mattox is typical of
the confusion courts underwent when attempting to apply a coherent, unified
standard of competency to juror affidavits alleging specific misconduct.
The Court in Mattox was willing to depart from the common law for two
reasons. First, its prior decision in Reid68 had hinted that the Court would
recognize juror affidavits alleging misconduct when the interests of justice so
demanded, although the Court had urged caution in creating those exceptions.
Second, the Court believed that the interests of justice would be served particu-
larly well by an exception that allowed jurors to testify to misconduct in which
they had engaged while determining the petitioner's fate in a capital case, be-
cause an individual's life was at stake.69 This second rationale, which stresses
the prevention of jury tampering and the importance of an accurate verdict, has
continued to justify a more thorough inquiry into jury behavior in criminal cases
even in recent times.70
In the first significant civil case to raise the issue of the competency of jury
63. Id. at 148-49 (citing Perry, 12 Kan. at 545) (affidavits "tended to prove something which
did not essentially inhere in the verdict, an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not
alone within the personal consciousness of one"). For a brief discussion of Perry, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-51.
64. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149 (citing Woodward, 107 Mass. at 466) ("A juryman may testify to
any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of the disturbing influence, but he cannot be
permitted to testify how far that influence operated upon his mind."). For a brief discussion of
Woodward, see supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
65. "The Perry rationale distinguishes between acts that are observed and subject to corrobora-
tion by other jurors and matters privately perceived by only one juror. The Woodward quotation
focuses on whether the testimony will reveal thought processes and deliberations." Thompson,
supra note 22, at 1198.
66. Cases following the "extraneous matter" test frequently have found testimony of jury mis-
conduct relating to misuse of the deliberation process to be incompetent. See, e.g., Bryson v. United
States, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957); Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109
F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 310 U.S. 640 (1940).
67. See Mueller, supra note 16, at 926.
68. For a brief discussion of Reid, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
69. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149.
70. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam); Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227 (1954); Carlson & Sumberg, supra note 20, at 269; Thompson, supra note 22, at 1209.
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affidavits, the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless7 1 retreated from its analysis
in Mattox and attempted to determine whether affidavits showing a quotient
verdict were competent. After weighing the individual litigant's interest in a
properly conducted trial against possible injury to the public, the Court found
three overriding reasons to exclude the testimony. First, to include it would
encourage jury harassment. 72 Second, it would make public, and thus discour-
age, what should be private: free and frank discussions within the jury room. 73
Third, to include such testimony would encourage losing litigants to tamper
with jury verdicts and thus prevent finality of litigation. 74 The McDonald Court
attempted to bolster its holding by claiming that the Mansfield Rule was almost
universally followed and, therefore, demanded the result the Court reached.75
However, the Court failed to recognize that the Mansfield Rule was concerned
solely with the untrustworthy nature of juror affidavits, not the public policy
considerations the Court had addressed. In addition, the Court made no men-
tion that it had, in Mattox,76 approved both the Perry77 distinction between
overt acts and matters that inhere in the individual conscience of the juror, and
the Woodward 78 distinction between "internal" and "external" influences. Had
the Court followed Perry, it is probable that the affidavits would have been
deemed competent; had it followed Woodward, it is probable that they would
not.
In a sense, it is not surprising that courts even in the same jurisdiction
reached inconsistent results and emphasized different policy concerns in doing
so. When the Mansfield Rule was divorced from its initial justification, numer-
ous policies arose to allow the Rule to retain its viability. These policies were
developed piecemeal, were at times contradictory, and frequently were inartfully
balanced. Nonetheless, at the time proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)
was under consideration in the early 1970s, all jurisdictions were in general
agreement on two categories of results. First, they agreed that matters within
the individual conscience of one or more jurors should remain inviolate. All
jurisdictions would have excluded as incompetent a juror who testified that he
failed to understand the law, misinterpreted the facts, was erroneously per-
suaded by fellow jurors to vote in a certain way, or did not truly agree to the
verdict. 79 In other words, all courts would have excluded evidence about a ju-
ror's defective reasoning process. Second, all courts probably would have admit-
ted evidence from jurors regarding the misconduct of a party or a court officer,
and would have admitted testimony from a court officer about certain restricted
71. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
72. Id. at 267.
73. Id. at 267-68.
74. Id. at 267.
75. Id. at 268.
76. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
79. See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
24, § 2349, at 681-82; Mueller, supra note 16, at 925.
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types of jury conduct.80
The primary differences among the various tests applied by the courts arose
from the manner in which they viewed occurrences inside the jury room that did
not involve testimony about the mental processes of individual jurors. Each test
involved a different analysis of whether to admit evidence regarding quotient
verdicts, decisions by lot, agreements to abide by majority rule,81 juror intoxica-
tion,82 or receipt of newspaper or third party comments to the jury.83 Within
this framework, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence began their work.
B. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
In an effort to resolve inconsistencies in federal law, the Federal Rules Ad-
visory Committee was charged with the duty of promulgating a uniform rule of
juror competency in matters of juror misconduct. In its first proposed draft, the
Advisory Committee settled on a codification of the Iowa Rule, which it be-
lieved was the trend.84 The proposed rule provided:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any state-
80. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2354, at 716.
81. Under the Mansfield Rule, a court would exclude juror affidavits alleging the verdict was
reached by improper methods on the basis that juror affidavits are incompetent evidence. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2354, at 711. Under the Iowa Rule, a court generally would admit
testimony of this nature. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210. Quotient verdicts and decisions by lot generally
have been excluded from evidence in federal court. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178
(1953); McDonald, 238 U.S. at 265, 269; Womble v. J.C. Penney Co., 431 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.
1970).
82. Under the Mansfield Rule, a court would exclude evidence from jurors as to their own
intoxication, but not evidence from third parties. See Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944. Under the Iowa
Rule a court probably would admit such evidence, although it is far from clear. See Bateman v.
Donovan, 131 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1942); Perry, 12 Kan. at 545-46. Federal courts generally
have been very reluctant to admit evidence regarding the physical or mental impairment of a juror.
See United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 78-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974);
United States v. Pellegrini, 441 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 586 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1050 (1978).
83. Under the Mansfield Rule, a court would exclude affidavits of jurors concerning receipt of
extraneous information in the jury room, but not affidavits from eavesdroppers. See Valse, 99 Eng.
Rep. at 944. Under the Iowa Rule, a court would admit such evidence, but exclude testimony
concerning the effect it had on the jury. See People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78
Cal. Rptr. 196, cert denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969). The federal approach generally has been to admit
such testimony and then determine whether it was sufficiently harmful to justify a new trial. See
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-66 (1966); Government of V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 153-
55 (3d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). But see United States v. Cauble, 532 F. Supp.
804, 809 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (concluding that juror testimony regarding exposure to news media re-
ports was only warranted if the nature of the reports "raises serious questions of possible prejudice,"
and it was likely that the reports were considered by the jury), aff'd, 757 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. The Advisory Committee explained its reasoning as follows:
The trend has been to draw the dividing line between testimony as to mental processes, on
the one hand, and as to the existence of conditions or occurrences of events calculated
improperly to influence the verdict, on the other hand, without regard to whether the hap-
pening is within or without the jury room.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) historical note.
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ment by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these
purposes.85
This proposal, however, encountered the objections of the Justice Depart-
ment and Senator McClellan, who emphasized the potential abuses to which
losing litigants could subject the Iowa approach. 86 The Advisory Committee's
final proposal, which eventually was adopted by the Supreme Court, added the
restriction, taken from Mattox 87 and Woodward,88 that jurors were not compe-
tent to testify about any occurrences or statements made during deliberations,
unless the testimony concerned extraneous prejudicial information or improper
outside influence. 89 When this final version was presented by the Supreme
Court to Congress, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
reinstated the initial proposal embodying the Iowa Rule, because it determined
that matters such as quotient verdicts could not be adequately remedied by more
precise jury instructions and were a problem of sufficient magnitude to merit a
broader rule of competence.90 The Senate Judiciary Committee, on the other
hand, favored the more restrictive Woodward approach, which would not have
permitted juror testimony about any matters that had arisen during jury deliber-
ations, except those involving "extraneous prejudicial information" and "outside
influence improperly brought to bear... "91 The Joint Conference adopted the
Senate version, which was passed by Congress and became Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b). 92
During the controversial evolution of Rule 606(b), little consideration was
given to the accuracy of individual jury verdicts or to the long-term effect of a
judicial system that consciously suppresses evidence of malfeasance. 93 The de-
bate focused instead on whether it was desirable to open the jury room door to
permit inquiry into objectively verifiable occurrences, or whether this inquiry
would lead to publicly undesirable results such as juror harassment or lack of
85. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 35, at t 606[03] (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)
(first proposed draft)).
86. See 117 CONG. REc. S33,582 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971) (statement of Senator McClellan).
Senator McClellan articulated his objections as follows:
My immediate fear is that proposed rule 606 would inevitably serve as an invitation to
unscrupulous defense counsel and guilty defendants to bully and browbeat Federal jurors
after the conclusion of the trial. . . .I have noted with growing concern the trend for
ingenuous defense counsel and recalcitrant defendants to resort to any and all means they
can to destroy our very system of justice.
Id.
87. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149; see supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
88. Woodward, 107 Mass. at 466; see supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
89. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
90. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1973), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. Appendix 1, at 167-68
(Law. Co-op. 1975) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
91. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. Appendix 2, at 203-04 (Law.
Co-op. 1975) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
92. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED.
R. EvID. Appendix 3, at 223-25 (Law. Co-op. 1975). For the final language of Rule 606(b), see
supra note 13.
93. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 91; Thompson, supra note 22, at 1204.
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verdict finality and judicial integrity. The legislative history of Rule 606(b) sug-
gests that a fairly diffuse accommodation was obtained, and the ambiguous
wording of the Rule makes it difficult to interpret. 94
As an attempt to assist lower courts in interpreting the Rule, the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee and the House Judiciary Committee, rather than
defining the offending conduct specifically, gave several examples of events that
in their opinions would not constitute "extraneous prejudicial information" or
"improper outside influence." The Advisory Committee suggested that compro-
mise verdicts, quotient verdicts, speculation about insurance coverage, or misun-
derstanding of juror instructions were not "extraneous prejudicial infor-
mation."' 95 The House Judiciary Committee recommended that verdicts de-
cided by lot or chance were not to be considered among those arrived at by an
"improper outside influence." 9 6
A great deal of litigation followed the enactment of Rule 606(b). Courts
interpreting these two key phrases struggled to fashion their own definitions to
fill the void left by the Advisory Committee. For example, one court interpreted
"extraneous influence" to include the receipt by jurors of news items or other
"'extra-record facts about the case,'" communications between the jurors and
third parties, or partial statements by the court.97 Other courts have construed
"extraneous prejudicial information" as receipt by the jury of information, other
than that received at trial, that is specific to the case. Examples include a juror
who relates his impressions of personal experience,98 the results of an experi-
ment he conducted relevant to an issue in the case,99 unauthorized viewings of a
site,1°° or knowledge acquired from the news media.10 1 Courts have recognized
"improper outside influences" when there were blatant attempts to bribe,
threaten, or influence jurors. 102 However, it is not clear why congressmen de-
bating Rule 606(b) and subsequent court decisions applying it have concluded
that the jury's use of a procedure based on chance is not an outside influence on
the verdict. 103
94. For example, one commentator has noted that if jurors were to arrive at a verdict by flip-
ping a coin, such evidence could be construed as admissible by categorizing the method as an outside
influence, contrary to the intentions of Congress. Thompson, supra note 22, at 1204.
95. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 266 advisory
committee's note, subdivision (b) (1973).
96. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 90, at 167.
97. United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (quoting Government of
V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976)), aff'd, 545 F.2d
864 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
98. See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1534, 1538 (4th Cir. 1986).
99. See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 211-13 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 929 (1983).
100. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Loveday, 273 F.2d 499, 499-500(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 802 (1960).
101. See United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1228 (1983).
102. See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978); Stimack v. Texas, 548 F.2d 588, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1977).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 35,
606[04], at 606-49 to -50.
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The arbitrary nature of the distinction between "inside" and "outside" in-
fluence is further demonstrated by Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ger-
eau.1° 4 Defendant in Gereau attempted to present juror affidavits allegedly
demonstrating that the verdict was influenced by two rumors jurors had heard
from outside sources. The first rumor concerned killings that had taken place
during the trial; the second alleged that the FBI was investigating the jurors'
families. A third rumor, attributable to no identifiable outside source, alleged
that someone was investigating the past conduct of three of the jurors them-
selves.105 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded
that the first two rumors could only be considered extraneous influences, and
thus competent evidence, if they "carried the coercive force of threats or brib-
ery," which they did not.10 6 However, juror testimony as to the third rumor
could never be considered competent because it was not an "intra-jury discus-
sion."' 10 7 The distinction probably would seem largely academic to a juror who
has heard alleged threats from whatever source, because the seriousness and
credibility of the threat would seem more likely to effect the juror's decision. A
rule of competency amounting to an exclusionary rule, foreclosing consideration
of threats primarily based on whether their source is inside or outside the jury
room, seems a blunt instrument to determine the magnitude of the influence.
More recently, the Supreme Court in Tanner v. United States 10 8 held that a
continuing binge of drug and alcohol abuse, engaged in collectively by several
jurors, was not an outside influence. 10 9 Justice O'Connor, for the majority, in-
terpreted the internal/external dichotomy to mean that physical location was
not the controlling factor: "The distinction was not based on whether the juror
was literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged irregularity took
place; rather, the distinction was based upon the nature of the allegation."' l10
The Court gave examples: a newspaper read inside the jury room was an exter-
nal influence, even though it occurred physically within the confines of the
room; but a juror's inability to comprehend the instructions of the court was an
internal matter, even though it manifested itself in open court.1 11 Having set out
these illustrations, the Court identified what it considered "most significant"
about the previous decisions as they applied to the case before it. The Court
stated flatly that "allegations of the physical or mental incompetence of a juror
[are treated] as 'internal' rather than 'external' matters."'1 12 The Court's exam-
ples involved juror insanity, sleep deprivation, illness, and inability to under-
stand English.1 13 The opinion did not develop the arguable distinctions between
104. 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
105. Id. at 151-52.
106. Id. at 152.
107. Id.
108. 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 1-12 (outlining facts in Tanner).
109. Id. at 2750.
110. Id. at 2746.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2747-48.
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those irregularities and the pervasive multiple-juror conduct, described as "one
big party," at issue in Tanner.
The most troublesome aspect of this reasoning, however, is the absence of a
test explaining what elements in the "nature of the allegations" make the differ-
ence between irregularities that will qualify as "external" and those that will not.
Why is the influence of a multiple-juror drug and alcohol binge "internal"-like
insanity-rather than "external"--like the influence of a newspaper shared by
jurors?' 14 The Court did buttress its reasoning by citing references in the legis-
lative history to the policies underlying Rule 606(b) and, in one passage, to in-
toxication of individual jurors as excludable. 115 Here again, however, no
reasonable test emerges to distinguish internal from external misconduct. The
Tanner Court brought the matter full circle by acknowledging that "'substan-
tial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency'" might qualify as show-
ing external influence. 116 The opinion in Tanner thus leaves open the possibility
that a jury composed of twelve blind drunks at the time of deliberations might be
the proper subject of inquiry. But the Court compounds the confusion, because
a change in the "nature of the allegation"-as opposed to a difference in de-
gree-is difficult to perceive.
In addition, many questions still are left unanswered in the interpretation of
Rule 606(b). For example, criminal cases continue to pose a special problem in
the application of the Rule, because the accused in such cases has the additional
constitutional protections of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 1 7 Such pro-
tections arguably tilt the balance in favor of the accused's right to receive a fair
trial when weighed against the public policy of reducing jury harassment and
increasing verdict stability and judicial integrity.
A disturbing context involving the issue of jury misconduct in criminal
cases occurs when a juror manifests racial bias during deliberations. Although
racial bias is difficult to classify as either "extraneous" information or an
"outside" influence under the reasoning of courts that have considered the issue,
it is clear that in egregious cases the resulting misconduct might offend funda-
mental fairness even though the legislative history of Rule 606(b) argues for
juror privacy. 1 8 For example, in Smith v. Brewer 1 9 petitioner sought a new
trial on the basis of one juror's testimony about internal pressures to convict,
114. At least one commentator has pointed out that some courts have viewed juror intoxication
as an "outside influence," rather than a matter internal to the workings of the jury deliberation
process. See.Mueller, supra note 16, at 952 & n.126 (citing Faith v. Neeley, 41 F.R.D. 361, 364-66
(N.D. W. Va. 1966); Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 764 (1947) (dictum)).
115. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2748-49.
116. Id. at 2750-51 (quoting United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974)).
117. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 1209 ("Recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized
an accused's constitutional rights in the decisionmaking process and cast substantial doubt on
whether the rule has any applicability in criminal cases.").
118. See Mueller, supra note 16, at 942 n.93. Mueller argues that "egregious racial or ethnic
prejudice" exhibited by jurors might be barred by Rule 606(b): "[S]uch proof arguably goes to the
'effect' of something upon the minds of such jurors, or the 'mental processes' of these jurors. On the
other hand, it is again at least arguable that such considerations amount to 'outside influence' as to
which impeaching evidence should be allowed." Id. at 942.
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racial remarks made during deliberations, and a comparison by one of the jurors
with a previous jury experience. 120 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa concluded that Rule 606(b) deemed evidence of inter-
nal pressures and racial bias incompetent, but received evidence of a juror's com-
parison of the case with another trial. 121 The court speculated, however, that if
the racially biased remarks were likely to have prejudiced the case, the court
might have considered such testimony competent, notwithstanding the apparent
import of Rule 606(b). 122
The difficulty with Rule 606(b) is that it embodies a delicate political com-
promise camouflaged by ambiguous language, rather than an expression of con-
sistent policy considerations. The Rule actually conceals the accommodation,
struck first by the Advisory Committee and then by Congress, between an accu-
rate process for seeking truth and a stable jury system. These two considerations
often diverge; when they do, the words of the Rule actually distract the court
from examining the underlying policies that might provide guidance in close
cases. Meanwhile, courts continue to confuse the issue of competency of juror
testimony with the question whether the alleged misconduct merits remedial ac-
tion, and they stretch the language of the Rule to allow for more liberal interpre-
tation in criminal cases.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON INFORMATION-GATHERING AND JUDGING
OF INFORMATION ON JURY MISCONDUCT
A. The Trial Court's Ability to Suppress Posttrial Investigation of Jury
Misconduct
Prevention of posttrial juror harassment or persuasion is frequently identi-
119. 444 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
(1978).
120. Id. at 485. The internal pressure to convict consisted of several jurors who repeatedly
"screamed and.., yelled" at the recalcitrant juror, asking, "What's wrong with you? Are you blind
that you can't see the evidence on the table? And is there anything wrong in your personal love? Do
you love your Bible? If you do, you know there are some things in there, some facts that you have to
accept." Another juror argued that "the evidence in a prior murder trial on which he sat as a juror
was not as strong as that in petitioner's case, 'but we got a conviction.'" One other juror recalled an
earlier trial in which petitioner's lawyer, a black man, had "gotten down on the floor." The juror
relating the story stated that "it really was quite funny." A different juror then mimicked the law-
yer, "strutting," imitating a black minstrel, and using a black dialect to repeat some of the things the
petitioner's lawyer had said during the trial. Id.
121. Id. at 487-88, 490. The court held that jurors' applying strong pressure for conviction on
other jurors has traditionally been considered incompetent evidence under Rule 606(b). The court
noted that, when the trial judge polled the jury, the recalcitrant juror remained silent, thus assenting
to the verdict. Id. at 487-88. The court also reasoned that the juror's remark comparing the case
under consideration with another trial in which he had been involved raised the question whether
jurors received extraneous information, but that its effect on the verdict was "de minimis" because
the juror recited no "factual analogies between the two cases" and it was an "isolated, offhand
remark." Id. at 490-91.
122. Id. at 490. The court interpreted the legislative history of Rule 606(b) as rejecting a stan-
dard that would permit inquiry into objective matters that were discussed in the jury room. How-
ever, the court cited McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915), for the proposition that "'there might
be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without "violating the
plainest principles of justice."' " Brewer, 444 F.2d at 490 (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268-69).
For discussion of McDonald, see supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
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fled as one of the most important policies that legitimately supports American
adaptations of the Mansfield Rule, including Rule 606(b). 123 But Rule 606(b),
like the Mansfield Rule, is primarily a rule of competency1 24 or, in other words,
an evidentiary exclusionary rule. As such, it is related only indirectly to the
problems of juror harassment or persuasion. Nothing in its language guides a
court in determining the real issues related to posttrial harassment-that is,
whether and under what conditions losing litigants should be permitted to con-
duct exploratory posttrial juror interviews, or whether and under what condi-
tions courts should allow follow-up investigations once preliminary information
about misconduct appears. 125 Yet these difficulties are not impervious to solu-
tion. In actuality, the former problem is resolved in part by local federal rules;
the latter problem is discussed in case law. The results, however, are not
uniform.
1. Local Rules Granting the Trial Court Authority to Supervise the
Investigation of Jury Misconduct
The local rules that govern the investigation of jury misconduct in federal
district courts, including those that explicitly require prior trial court approval,
vary substantially. For example, a local rule of the Middle District of Louisiana
tersely provides that "[a]bsent an order of the Court, no juror shall be inter-
viewed by anyone at any time concerning the deliberations of the jury."1 26 The
rules of the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, on the other hand,
include a more comprehensive directive:
Communication with Jurors. Upon the return of a verdict by the jury
in any civil or criminal action, neither the attorneys in the action nor
the parties may, in the courtroom or elsewhere, express to the mem-
bers of the jury their pleasure or displeasure with the verdict. After
the jury has been discharged, neither the attorneys in the action nor
the parties shall at any time or in any manner communicate with the
jury or any member thereof regarding the verdict. Provided, however,
that if any attorney believes in good faith that the verdict may be sub-
ject to legal challenge, such attorney may apply ex parte to the trial
judge for permission to interview one or more members of the jury
regarding any fact or circumstance claimed to support such legal chal-
lenge. If satisfied that good cause exists, such judge may grant permis-
sion for the attorney to make the requested communication and shall
prescribe the terms and conditions under which the same may be
conducted. 127
Local rules also vary considerably in other respects. Although most rules specif-
123. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2747-48; McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267; United States v. Schwartz, 787
F.2d 257, 262 (7th Cir. 1986); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985); Govern-
ment of V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); United
States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
124. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 35, 1 606[04], at 606-25.
125. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 35, 1 606[06], at 606-64 to -68.
126. U.S. DIST. Cr. M.D. LA. R. 16A(5).
127. U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. MIss. R. l(b)(4); U.S. DIST. Cr. S.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4).
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ically prohibit attorneys from contacting jurors without court approval after a
verdict is rendered, 128 several require that this approval be obtained before the
jurors are discharged.1 29
To obtain approval, some local rules mandate the filing of a written petition
with the trial court, 130 but most do not. 131 Regardless of whether a written
petition to interview is required, a few local rules require the judge to set appro-
priate limitations on the inquiry before granting an attorney leave to interview a
juror. 132 In most other jurisdictions, the trial judge is not required to set limita-
tions on the inquiry but probably may do so under her implied authority to
prevent juror harassment. 133
Local rules also may be distinguished on the basis of whether they prohibit
only the attorneys from contacting jurors, or whether that prohibition extends to
parties, friends, and representatives of persons involved in the litigation.1 34 A
few local rules permit juror contact through written interrogatories, 135 although
most rules contemplate oral questioning. Surprisingly, many rules do not ad-
dress the question whether opposing counsel must be notified of a petition to
interview. 136 Several rules, however, specifically grant opposing counsel an op-
portunity to be heard as to whether leave should be granted.1 37
Perhaps the most striking difference in local rules is between those rules
128. See, eg., U.S. DisT. Cr. N.D. TEX. R. 8.2(e); U.S. DisT. Cr. W.D. TENN. R. 19; U.S.
DIsT. Cr. W.D. WASH. R. 47(b); U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. W. VA. R. 1.19. But see U.S. DIsT. Cr.
E.D.N.C. R. 6.03 (prohibiting only contacts calculated to harass or embarrass juror or influence
future jury service).
129. See, eg., U.S. DIST. Cr. E.D. TEx. R. 10(b); cf. U.S. DIST. Cr. D.C. R. 115(b) (if no
request made before discharge, permission will be granted only "for good cause shown in writing").
130. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. Cr. S.D. ALA. R. 12; U.S. DIsT. Cr. KAN. R. 23A.
131. See, eg., U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4); U.S. DIsT. Cr. S.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4); U.S.
DIST. Cr. W.D. TENN. R. 19; U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. W. VA. R. 1.19.
132. U.S. DisT. Cr. N.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4); U.S. DIST. Cr. S.D. MIss. R. l(b)(4); U.S. DIST. Cr.
W.D. TENN. R. 19. The local rules for the District of Columbia permit the district judge to require
that any juror be questioned "only in the presence of the court." See U.S. DIsT. Cr. D.C. R. 115(b).
133. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. Cr. N.D. W. VA. R. 1.18; U.S. DIST. Cr. S.D. OHIO R. 5.6.
134. The following jurisdictions prohibit only parties or their attorneys from contacting jurors:
U.S. DIsT. Cr. D.C. R. 115(b); U.S. DIsT. Cr. N.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4); U.S. DIsT. Cr. S.D. MIss. R.
l(b)(4); U.S. DIST. Cr. E.D. TEx. R. 10. The following jurisdictions specifically extend the prohibi-
tion to representatives of the parties or attorneys seeking contact: U.S. DIsT. Cr. KAN. R. 23A
("lawyers.... their agents or employees"); U.S. DisT. Cr. W.D. LA. R. 16 ("attorney or any party[,]
... investigator or other person acting for him"); U.S. DIsT. Cr. E.D.N.C. R. 6.03 ("attorney or
party litigant[,J . . . investigator or any person acting for [him]"); U.S. DIST. Cr. MD. R. 25A
("attorney or party .... through any investigator or other person acting for him"); U.S. DIsT. Cr.
E.D. Mo. R. 16(D) ("attorney or any party.., or... any other person"); U.S. DIsT. Cr. N.J. R.
19(B) ("attorney or party[,] ... investigator or other person acting for such attorney or party"); U.S.
Disr. Cr. S.D. OHIo R. 5.6 ("attorney,] ... any investigator or other person acting for him"); U.S.
DisT. Cr. M.D. TENN. R. 12(h) ("attorney, party, or representative"); U.S. DisT. Cr. W.D. TENN.
R. 19 ("attorney, party, or representative"); U.S. DIsT. Cr. N.D. W. VA. R. 1.19 ("party, his agent
or his attorney or any other person acting for them").
135. See U.S. DisT. Cr. ARIz. R. 12(b); U.S. DIsT. Cr. Wyo. R. 411.
136. In fact, at least one set of local rules specifically permits litigants to apply ex parte to the
court for permission to interview jurors after the trial. U.S. DIsT. Cr. N.D. Miss. R. 1(b)(4); U.S.
DIsT. Cr. S.D. Miss. R. l(b)(4).
137. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. Cr. N.D. W. VA. R. 1.19; cf. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,
230 (1954) (case remanded to the district court to conduct a hearing "with all interested parties
permitted to participate").
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that require the moving attorney to show good cause before being allowed to
interview jurors 138 and those that set no standard for the trial judge to follow. 139
In good cause jurisdictions the rules do not indicate how a losing litigant can
show good cause without first conducting the interview he is petitioning to ob-
tain. 140 Presumably, a chance remark overheard by a party, physical evidence
of misconduct left in the jury room, or testimony from nonjury witnesses might
constitute good cause, although appellate opinions do not directly address this
issue and tend to uphold the trial court's exercise of discretion without reasoned
analysis.' 4 ' Nonetheless, by impliedly requiring a fully independent source
before leave to interview is granted, the local rules that require good cause often
indicate that the existence of proof cannot be investigated unless the existence of
some proof already is known.
2. Jurisdictions With No Local Rules Concerning Jury Interrogation
In the few federal jurisdictions that have no local rules prohibiting a losing
litigant from interviewing jurors after trial, the appellate courts have developed
principles to govern trial court actions. For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that it historically has required a showing
of specific instances of misconduct before requiring the trial judge to allow inter-
rogation. 142 Motions for leave to interview that are mere "fishing expeditions"
based on the hope of impeaching the verdict have been disallowed in favor of
protecting the jury from harassment, saving the courts from time-consuming
and futile proceedings, and increasing the certainty of verdicts.143
Other jurisdictions, such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, have declined the invitation to formulate guidelines governing the
entire subject of postverdict interrogation of jurors, but have granted the trial
judge the authority to direct that all interrogation be conducted under court
138. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. Cr. KAN. R. 23A; U.S. DisT. Cr. E.D. Mo. R. 16(D); U.S. DIST. Cr.
N.J. R. 19(B); U.S. DisT. Cr. S.D. OHIO R. 5.6.
139. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-108 (1980) ("the lawyer
shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to
harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service") and U.S. DisT. CT.
E.D.N.C. R. 6.03 (prohibition against asking questions "calculated merely to harass," "embarrass,"
or "influence" jurors or their families) with U.S. DIsT. Cr. E.D. TEX. R. 10(b) (granting attorney
right to obtain leave of court to interview jurors after verdict, but setting no standard by which such
leave should be granted).
140. See, eg., U.S. DIST. Cr. W.D. LA. R. 16 (prohibiting attorneys from contacting jurors
without showing good cause to do so); U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. MIss. R. l(b)(4) (prohibiting attorneys
from contacting jurors unless attorney "believes in good faith that the verdict may be subject to legal
challenge").
141. See, e.g., O'Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Historically, interrogations of jurors have not been
favored by federal courts except where there is some showing of illegal or prejudicial intrusion into
the jury process."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977).
142. See Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Maldo-
nado v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 798 F.2d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the party seeking to question jurors
post-verdict must make a 'preliminary showing of misconduct' ") (quoting Wilkerson v. AMCO
Corp., 703 F.2d 154, 186 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1571 (1987).
143. Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 150 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Wilker-
son v. AMCO Corp., 703 F.2d 184, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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supervision. 144 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly afforded the
trial court broad discretion to control the manner of inquiry. 14 5 In this regard,
it has specifically approved of trial court orders that have required the
postverdict jury questioning to be done in open court. 146 The Second Circuit
has also approved orders that have allowed depositions when opposing counsel
has been given the right to object to improper questions, and orders that have
passed in advance on the questions to be propounded.147 Occasionally, courts
have even suggested that postverdict interviews of jurors by trial counsel are
unethical and have found it necessary to restrict the process by injunction.148 In
sum, there is little uniformity among jurisdictions either with or without local
federal rules, although a trial judge probably can be confident of appellate ap-
proval if he directs any postverdict interrogation of jurors to be conducted under
his supervision. 149
3. American Bar Association Standards
To complicate the problem, numerous district courts have published rules
adopting the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, which contains standards of conduct governing posttrial jury interroga-
tion.150 Disciplinary Rule 7-108 of the Code provides:
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with
which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of
or make comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely
to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future
jury service.15 1
However, countervailing considerations are such that this provision raises as
many questions as it answers. The American Bar Association (ABA) Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics, in Formal Opinion 319, interpreted this provision as
being in harmony with the lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client. In
pursuit of such representation, the ABA Committee wrote that a lawyer "must
144. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Brasco, 385 F.
Supp. 966, 970 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
860 (1975).
145. See King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 439 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978).
146. See Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227 (1954)).
147. See id.
148. United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
149. See United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 819 n.4 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 860 (1975).
150. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-29 to -31 (1980). This canon
has been redrafted as Rule 3.5(b) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, which states:
RULE 3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means pro-
hibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law; or
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(b) (1987).
151. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) (1980).
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have the tools for ascertaining whether or not grounds for a new trial exist." 15 2
Thus, the opinion concluded that "it is not unethical for [the lawyer] to talk to
and question jurors [as long as the lawyer does not] harass, entice, induce or
exert influence on a juror to obtain his testimony."' 153
This formulation largely begs the question because it does not distinguish
the point at which well-intended but persistent interrogation, designed to im-
prove a losing litigant's position, should give way to considerations of jury har-
assment, verdict finality, and judicial integrity. Furthermore, the ABA Rule
and Formal Opinion 319 do not identify the procedures by which the court
should prevent, consider, or redress violations. A partial answer to these ques-
tions can be found in United States v. Driscoll,154 a decision that preceded adop-
tion of Rule 606(b), in which defense counsel hired a private investigator to
question jurors about how they reached their verdict. The investigator had con-
ducted telephone conversations with three of the jurors and a personal interview
with a fourth. On the Government's petition for an injunction against these
activities, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that an injunction should issue, because the "apparent ... purpose
was... 'to browse among... thoughts [of the jurors] in search of something to
invalidate their verdict.' "155 Despite defense claims that such browsing would
substantially contribute to improving defense counsel's legal abilities, the court
concluded that the duty of zealous representation does not imply the authority
to conduct exploratory posttrial interviews of jurors in the absence of concrete
indications of misconduct. 15 6 In other words, the court's concern for protecting
the integrity of the jury system prevailed over the litigants' interests in zealous
representation.
Generally, however, courts have not distinguished these two objectives to
any great extent. Most cases refuse to give great weight to the trial technique
improvement argument in favor of protecting jurors from the pressure of public
disclosure of their deliberations.15 7 Nonetheless, the American Bar Associa-
tion's standards have created conflict in interpreting the extent to which
information admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) should be investi-
gated, especially in those jurisdictions in which Canon 7 or its successor in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is enforced by statute or court rule.
B. Procedures for Determining Misconduct
Just as there are no uniform rules governing the acquisition of evidence of
jury misconduct through posttrial jury interviews, there are no rules specifically
governing the procedure for reviewing evidence of misconduct once
152. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 319 (1968).
153. Id.
154. 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
155. Id. at 338 (quoting State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 106-07, 199 A.2d 630, 635 (1964)).
156. Id.
157. See, eg., Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021-22(5th Cir. 1984) (denial of
motion to interview jurors to educate counsel upheld).
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presented.1 58 The usual way in which allegations of juror misconduct are
presented is through a motion for a new trial. 159 However, the time limitations
on this particular procedural device are relatively short, 160 and because some
misconduct comes to the attention of litigants months or even years after the
verdict, courts have permitted parties to make a case for a new trial by means of
attacks on the judgment. 16 1 The party making a preliminary showing usually is
granted a hearing at the discretion of the trial court. 162 This hearing is a consti-
tutional requirement in criminal cases.1 63 Occasionally, the matter has been re-
solved in camera, 164 but often it is conducted in court in the presence of counsel
for both sides and juror-witnesses. 16 5
The burden of demonstrating both misconduct and harm under Rule 606(b)
is on the moving party,166 but under some circumstances that party is aided by
presumptions of prejudice. For example, improper communication between ju-
rors and any third party in criminal cases frequently has been found presump-
tively prejudicial, with the burden shifting to the government once the
communication has been established to show that the contact was harmless.1 67
On occasion, when confronted with especially blatant attempts to influence a
jury, courts also have held certain kinds of misconduct presumptively prejudicial
in civil cases, 168 but these holdings are the exception.
158. Mueller, supra note 16, at 960.
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 59; FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; see Holden v. Porter, 405 F.2d 878, 879 (10th Cir.
1969) (per curiam).
160. In a civil case, motions for new trial must be filed within ten days after entry of judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 59. In a criminal case, such motions must be filed within seven days of judgment,
unless based on newly discovered evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. At least one court has held that
improper communications between a juror and a third party during deliberations is newly discovered
evidence for purposes of FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. See Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716, 719 (4th
Cir. 1960); United States v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 31
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). Rule 60(b)(2) provides that a motion
for relief of judgment made within one year after judgment is allowed on the ground of "newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b)." FED R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). In addition, Rule 60(b) permits a party to
bring an independent action for relief at any time after judgment. Id.
162. United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 922(1979); United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227-29 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1977).
163. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
164. The practice of holding such hearings in camera was not deemed reversible error when the
appellant was unable to show prejudice as a result of such a hearing. See United States v. Parker,
549 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977). However, dicta frequently has indicated that the better practice
is to conduct the hearing with express consent of counsel or with counsel present. Id.; see also
United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting claim that defendant was
denied his rights where judge held voir dire of jurors in chambers after counsel agreed not to be
present), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978).
165. See Rem'mer, 347 U.S. at 230.
166. Maldonado v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 798 F.2d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1571 (1987); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); Government of V.I. v.
Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
167. Remmer, 350 U.S. at 379; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892); United States
v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968, 971 (6th Cir.
1973).
168. See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th Cir. 1986); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Krause v. Rhodes,
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In the majority of cases, however, the trial judge must make a determina-
tion unaided by presumptions and without any inquiry into the actual effect of
the alleged extraneous prejudicial information or improper influences on the
jury. 169 Courts have correctly reasoned that because losing litigants are prohib-
ited from presenting evidence of the mental or emotional processes of jurors, the
trial judge should likewise be barred from making such inquiries and may only
determine prejudice by drawing reasonable inferences. 170 In short, the trial
judge must attempt to reach a subjective conclusion based on objective facts.
Although this approach is not entirely satisfactory, it has the advantage of
consistency.
In summary, the gap left by Rule 606 (b) between regulating jury interviews
and judging the degree of prejudice once a hearing is obtained has been filled to
some degree by an overlay of local federal rules, the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, and decisional law. There appears to be a trend toward
liberally granting interviews subject to supervision by the court.1 7 1 There also
appears to be a trend toward new trials in criminal cases upon a lesser showing
of prejudice that may result from jurors' exposure to extraneous prejudicial in-
formation or improper influences, because of a criminal defendant's additional
constitutional protections. 172 However, when viewed as a whole, the process of
investigating and judging jury misconduct is not uniform and sometimes is irra-
tional. This result follows from the absence of policy-related guidelines in inter-
preting Rule 606(b) and from the effort, embodied in that Rule, to regulate
conflicting goals by an ambiguously worded exclusionary principle enunciated in
terms of witness competence. 173
III. THE RULE 606(b) EXCLUSIONARY PRINCIPLE, JURY INVESTIGATION
RULES, AND PUBLIC POLICY: SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION
Courts and commentators seldom have analyzed seriously the interdepen-
dence of Rule 606(b) and local rules regulating jury interviews. In fact, the two
kinds of rules should work in harmony, as parts of a single effort to achieve the
policy goals of each. Part of the difficulty with Rule 606(b) is that it does not
reflect a harmonized approach. Furthermore, consistent application of the Rule
is impeded by Congress' adoption of catchphrases originating in early decisions,
rather than language that would narrow and focus the unavoidable policy
choices. For these reasons, it would be desirable to redraft both Rule 606(b) and
570 F.2d 563, 567-68 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978). However, there is a general
presumption that the verdict is valid. United States v. Robbins, 500 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1974).
169. Maldonado v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 798 F.2d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1571 (1987); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. How-
ard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975).
170. See Howard, 506 F.2d at 869.
171. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
172. See Rushen, 464 U.S. at 118-19.
173. One commentator has noted, "The attempt to effectuate significant policy considerations
affecting vital substantive rights by rules of competency is like trying to eat soup with a fork.
Although by proper manipulation some nourishment can be supplied, the process is hit or miss with
substantial and unacceptable side effects." Thompson, supra note 22, at 1221-22.
[Vol. 66
JURY MISCONDUCT
the procedural rules with which it operates, so that they would work in a unified
manner and better reflect their underlying goals.
A. The Policies at Issue
1. Prevention of Juror Harassment and Postverdict Persuasion
Rule 606 (b) and its antecedents often were justified by the need to prevent
undue juror harassment 174 and postverdict persuasion. 175 These actually are
separate concerns. First, every juror-whether strong-minded or weak-minded,
whether in the minority or in the majority-should be free of offensive, inquisi-
tional contacts.' 76 Second, there is the possibility that losing attorneys effec-
tively may be able to retry their cases by pressuring jurors who were reluctant to
join in the verdict in the first place. Such pressure could cause reluctant jurors
to recall differently or to attach a different significance to events during delibera-
tions.177 Although Rule 606(b) has been justified by these considerations, such a
justification is unpersuasive. As an exclusionary principle, Rule 606(b) actually
is a poor vehicle for achieving the goals of avoiding juror harassment and
postverdict persuasion because the Rule addresses them only indirectly, and
rules regulating jury investigation are likely to be far more effective in this
regard.
2. Efficient Allocation of Judicial Resources, and Judicial Integrity
Trial judges may accurately conclude that their time is inappropriately used
if they are frequently called on to decide marginal jury misconduct claims. The
energy and motivation of a skillful trial lawyer who has lost a jury trial is not to
be underestimated. An adverse jury verdict is a painful event, combining per-
sonal rejection and professional failure with injury to the client who relied on the
lawyer. The losing trial lawyer, therefore, may have an unusually strong inclina-
tion to search vigorously for misconduct, attribute the loss to it, and construct
arguments maximizing the effect of marginal violations, even as she searches her
own mind for the cause of the verdict. For these reasons, open reception of
evidence of jury misconduct would consume judicial resources inefficiently.
Furthermore, the result would pressure the judiciary on a policy consideration
separate from the merits of the case. Because instances of minor jury miscon-
duct are common, judges who freely heard them would frequently be placed in
the position of finding violations but denying new trials. The American revi-
sions of the Mansfield Rule are supported by the theory that repeated decisions
of this kind would undermine judicial integrity.17 8 Because this policy has some
174. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2747; McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) ("Jurors
would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts
which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict."); Government of V.I. v. Gereau,
523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
175. See Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
764 (1947).
176. See Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148.
177. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892).
178. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2747-48; People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 348-50, 455 P.2d
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importance and in any event has undeniably affected the jurisprudence, it should
be openly recognized and integrated into new trial decisions based on jury mis-
conduct. Thus, unlike the concern for jury harassment or persuasion, the poli-
cies of judicial efficiency and integrity can be protected only by an exclusionary
rule that prevents the waste of judicial resources and reduces forced decisions
about new trials.
3. Verdict Stability
An additional policy favors the stability of verdicts and judgments.1 79 It is
important that the judicial process succeed in resolving disputes, a goal that
cannot be accomplished if the process is subject to unattainable standards. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated the point
succinctly:
[I]t would be impracticable to impose the [requirement] of absolute
perfection that no verdict shall stand unless every juror has been en-
tirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence he has
heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred
verdicts would stand such a test.180
The granting of new trials based on jurors' mental processes is prohibited be-
cause it would be anathema to stability; indeed, the setting aside of jury verdicts
on any but the most egregious grounds would cost more in terms of stability and
finality than it could possibly gain. For these purposes, neither an exclusionary
rule nor restriction of jury investigation is absolutely necessary, although those
approaches may work toward the goal by narrowing even the possibility of new
trials. The more direct means of accomplishing this goal would be a procedural
rule limiting new trials to instances of egregious misconduct.
4. Fairness, Perceived Fairness, and Accuracy in the Sense
of Rational Truth-Seeking
A sensible approach also must take into account the policies opposing re-
strictions on investigation or evidence of jury misconduct. First, the trial pro-
cess must be fair, and provide the parties with adequate opportunity to redress
miscarriages of justice.18 1 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the process
must be perceived as fair by participants and observers. This objective implies
that the ability to gather and present evidence in an ostensibly fair proceeding
132, 136-37, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, 200-01, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969); see also Note, Public
Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARv. L. REV. 886, 888-92 (1983) (cited in Tanner, 107 S. Ct.
at 2748) (supporting idea that postverdict scrutiny of jury misconduct undermines community trust
in the judicial system).
179. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2747-48 (citing Government of V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79-80 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974)).
180. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947).
181. See Carlson & Sumberg, supra note 20, at 271; Concannon, Impeaching Civil Verdicts: Ju-
ror Statements as Prejudicial Misconduct, 52 J. KAN. B.A. 201, 201-02 (1983).
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has cathartic value. Last, there is the goal of accuracy.18 2 Because this goal
pertains to the decision on the merits, and an inquiry into jury misconduct is a
step removed from the merits, accurate determination of new trial issues does
not lead automatically to accurate determination of the issues at stake in the
underlying litigation. Nevertheless, at some point improper influence or miscon-
duct becomes sufficiently serious to interfere with the merits of a case. These
countervailing objectives indicate that an exclusionary rule preventing proof of
serious misconduct, or a rule preventing the investigation that would discover it,
would be dysfunctional.
Interestingly, both the policies supporting restrictions on investigation or
evidence of jury misconduct and the countervailing policies-although arguably
conflicting in close cases-lead to the same conclusion. Instances of egregious
misconduct or influence should be subject to investigation, proof, and decision,
but lesser incidents should not be. In order to reach this result, Congress and
the courts must coordinate the various rules and design different but more con-
sistent standards.
B. Narrowing but Retaining the Exclusionary Rule of 606(b)
Exclusionary rules serve at least three different purposes. First, they may
serve the judicial objective of a rational search for truth by excluding unreliable
evidence, or by encouraging attorneys to present their evidence in the form that
is most amenable to testing and evaluation. The hearsay rules, 183 certain com-
petency principles,18 4 and the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to
exclude unduly prejudicial evidence are examples. Second, an exclusionary rule
may conserve judicial resources. Thus, Rule 403 allows the judge to exclude
cumulative evidence, or evidence that will occasion an undue consumption of
time.185 Third, exclusionary rules are sometimes designed to achieve collateral
182. See People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, cert denied, 396
U.S. 994 (1969).
183. FED. R. EvID. 801-804; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 244, at 725.
184. See C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 20, §§ 61-69. The early common law had rigid and some-
times irrational rules for preventing certain witnesses from testifying. For example, the common law
deemed incompetent persons who were insane, who had no religious beliefs, who had been convicted
of a crime, or who were married to a party. The basis for these exclusions lay in the common-law
theory that such witnesses, because of their possible bias or deficient mental or moral condition, were
likely to give inaccurate or even perjured testimony. Under modem rules of evidence, such as Rule
601, all witnesses are deemed competent and cannot be disqualified on the grounds of religious belief,
conviction of a crime, or having a connection with the litigation as a party, interested person, or
spouse of a party or interested person. FED R. EVID. 601 advisory committee note. Nonetheless,
trial courts have the discretion to disqualify a witness who is too young or too mentally infirm to tell
the truth or coherently narrate events. In addition, many state jurisdictions still recognize the Dead
Man's Statute as disqualifying a surviving party from testifying against the estate of the deceased
concerning a transaction or communication with the deceased. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 4.3 (2d ed. 1987). Thus, even in modem times, the policy of exclusion of
unreliable evidence still supports the finding that certain narrow categories of witnesses are incompe-
tent to testify.
185. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. McCormick concludes that "time-consumption is the fundamental
reason to exclude relevant evidence." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 185, at 546 n.34.
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purposes. The exclusionary rule that is an outgrowth of the fourth amendment
to the Constitution is an example, 18 6 and to a lesser extent so is the parallel rule
associated with the fifth amendment. 187 These principles are designed not to
serve the goal of a rational search for truth, or the policy of judicial efficiency,
but rather to enforce notions of proper police conduct and judicial integrity.1 88
When exclusionary rules are used for collateral purposes, they can have great
costs and can be inefficiently related to their objectives; 189 consequently, they
should be narrowly tailored to achieve their purposes.
The exclusionary principle reflected in Rule 606(b) has been justified as
serving each of these purposes. The Rule originated out of concern by common-
law judges about unreliability, and continues to be supported by arguments re-
specting judicial efficiency and integrity, as well as the collateral purposes of
preventing juror harassment, persuasion, and verdict instability. Rule 606(b)
should be narrowly focused to achieve those purposes it actually can achieve.
1. The Disadvantages of Exclusionary Rules: A Blunderbuss
Rather than a Scalpel
It may be useful to compare the exclusionary principle underlying Rule
606(b) with the exclusionary rule that is used in criminal cases as a means of
enforcing the fourth amendment. The original justification for the latter exclu-
sionary rule was to deter "official lawlessness in flagrant abuse [of the Constitu-
tion]."' 190 By excluding the fruits of this kind of lawlessness, the courts
presumably would deter future police misconduct and would, in effect, police the
police. 19 1 Additionally, the Supreme Court believed that judicial integrity was
impaired when courts allowed convictions to be based on tainted evidence ob-
tained by the same governments of which the courts were a part.192 Thus, from
its onset the exclusionary rule in criminal cases had as its moving force the theo-
ries of deterrence of illegal police conduct and the protection of judicial integ-
rity-purposes collateral to the goal of fair and accurate resolution of disputes.
Dissatisfaction with the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as a means of
accomplishing these purposes has produced criticism throughout its history.
The criticisms, although controversial, have sought to demonstrate that the rule
cannot and does not accomplish its primary purpose of deterring illegal police
186. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
187. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
188. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658-59 (1961) (exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases designed to
deter illegal police conduct); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (exclusionary rule in cases involving
involuntary confessions by criminal defendants designed to deter coercion of confessions by police).
189. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215, 215
(1978).
190. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
191. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1983); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223
(1960) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal" would be far worse than to let the criminal go free)).
192. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660; cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Flor my part, I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the Government should play an ignoble part.").
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conduct.193 Furthermore, there have been indications that the exclusionary rule
has disproportionate costs, in terms of both inaccurate results and loss of public
respect, relative to any benefits it produces. 194 In particular, notions of judicial
integrity may be advanced by the exclusion of evidence produced by flagrant
misconduct, 195 but when the same rule is applied to objectively reasonable
searches conducted in good faith, it creates a widespread public belief that the
criminal law is a mass of dysfunctional technicalities, a belief which thereby
undermines judicial, integrity. 19 6 It also has been argued that efficiency and ac-
curacy are impaired by unavoidable complexity and frequent changes in the law
governing an exclusionary principle. Thus, decisions in certain areas related to
the fourth amendment (such as searches pursuant to automobile stops) have be-
come diffuse, obscure, and difficult to predict. 19 7
With these difficulties in mind, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Massachusetts v. Sheppard 198 and its companion case, United States v. Leon.199
Both cases arose out of searches that resulted from warrants which later were
193. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665,
678 (1970) (empirical study showing absence of deterrent effect and describing rationale as " 'fig leaf
phrases used to cover naked ignorance' ") (quoting W. DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 101
(1926)); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 50-57 (1977); cf. COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTIONS, Rep. No. CGD-79-45 (Apr. 19, 1979) (GAO study); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982) (showing absence of
deterrent effect). Contra United States v. ianis, 428 U.S. 433, 450-52 n.22 (1976) ("[n]o empirical
researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule has yet been able to establish with any assurance
whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in situations in which it is applied"); Canon, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979) (arguing
that rule does deter illegal police conduct).
194. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (" 'unbending application of the exclu-
sionary rule sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the
truth finding functions of judge and jury' ") (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734
(1980)); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976) (indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule may generate disrespect for the law and administration of justice).
195. See, eg., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (excluding from evidence fingerprints of
defendant who was jailed after a dragnet arrest of anyone remotely suspected of having committed a
crime); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (excluding from evidence "numbers game tickets" taken
from petitioner after he was arrested, when probable cause consisted solely of petitioner having a
previous conviction).
196. One Supreme Court case recognized this danger:
There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt-that discredit will
even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment-if gossamer pos-
sibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of
competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
197. The fragmentation of search and seizure opinions is illustrated by the syllabus to one
Supreme Court decision:
Stewart, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, II-B, II-C, and III, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist, JJ., joined.... Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment, in which Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., joined.... White., J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 546 (1980). These divisions are not unusual in search
and seizure law. See Rose v. Lundy, 465 U.S. 509 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
198. 468 U.S. 981 (1983).
199. 468 U.S. 897 (1983).
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found defective.2° ° The lower courts had held the searches unconstitutional ac-
cording to applicable law. In both instances, however, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized what has been termed the "good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule" and admitted the fruits of the searches because the officers had acted in a
manner that was both objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith. 20 '
Significantly, the Court arrived at this determination by reasoning that the poli-
cies underlying the exclusionary rule were not served by its broader application.
When the officer's objective conduct is reasonable, excluding the evidence will
not affect his future conduct "'unless it is to make him less willing to do his
duty.' ",202 The Leon Court also was concerned with the costs that were borne
by society when evidence was suppressed, and commented that "unbending ap-
plication of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of government rectitude
would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. '20 3
The Court reasoned that when law enforcement officers act in good faith and
their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefits that would
be conferred on the guilty defendant would offend basic concepts of criminal
justice, creating disrespect for the law.2 ° 4
A rule excluding evidence of jury misconduct or improper influence, such
as Rule 606(b), should be subject to the same analysis, even though the costs
and benefits are different in character. In particular, if the rule results in the
exclusion of evidence of serious misconduct in a way that does little to protect
against juror harassment, judicial inefficiency, verdict instability, or other objec-
tives of exclusion, it should be revised. In this regard, the blanket exclusion of
nonextraneous misconduct and improper influences that do not happen to origi-
nate outside the courtroom is dysfunctional for two reasons. First, the terminol-
ogy of Rule 606(b) has an ambiguous relationship to policy objectives; and
second, in some instances the terminology actually may contradict those
objectives.
200. In Leon, the district court found the search warrant defective because it lacked probable
cause. Id. at 904. The lower court applied a two-pronged test for probable cause as set out in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). A
Supreme Court case, decided after the lower court decisions in Leon, abandoned this two-pronged
test in favor of an approach that took into account the "totality-of-the-circumstances." Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); see Leon, 468 U.S. at 904 & n.5. Despite the application of the two-
pronged test, the district court in Leon recognized that the officer had gone to a "Superior Court
judge and got a warrant [and] obviously [had] laid a meticulous trail. Had surveilled for a long
period of time, and ... consulted with three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding himself,"
and was acting in good faith in making the search and seizure. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904 n.4. In
Sheppard the Court found a defect in the technical language of the warrant. The warrant's
preprinted language authorized a search for controlled substances, but the officer's affidavit re-
quested a warrant to search for a murder weapon and property of the victim thought to be in defend-
ant's possession. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 984-87.
201. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23; Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988; see also Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct.
1160, 1167-68 (1987) (good faith exception applies to evidence "obtained by an officer acting in
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute" even though statute is subsequently held
unconstitutional).
202. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)); see Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1167-68.
203. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
204. Id. at 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976)).
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For example, a decision reached by jurors heavily under the influence of
alcohol should be subject to examination, irrespective of whether one considers
intoxication to be an inside or an outside influence. The seriousness of the influ-
ence and its objectively reasonable effect on the jury's verdict, rather than its
characterization, ultimately should be the determinant of a new trial. In Tanner
the Supreme Court appears to have acknowledged this view, at least in the hypo-
thetical situation of serious intoxication, even though it purported to follow Rule
606(b).205 The tacit recognition that the exclusionary rule's costs would out-
weigh its benefits in such a situation underlies this dictum. Another example is
that in which a majority juror or jurors, exasperated by the perceived (or actual)
unreasonableness of a fellow juror in the minority, threatens him with violence
inside the jury room.20 6 A committee of the American Bar Association recently
has voted to recommend an exception to Rule 606(b) for precisely such a
case.207 The point is not whether a threat of violence by one juror against an-
other contains "extraneous" information or whether it is an "outside" influence.
Rather, the point is that an exclusionary rule such as the competency principle
embodied in Rule 606(b), which would prevent evidence of the occurrence even
from being presented, is excessively costly.
2. Tailoring Rule 606(b) to Exclude Nonauthoritative Deliberation Remarks:
Revision or Construction?
Congress should adopt an exclusionary principle broader than the Iowa
Rule2° s -which inadequately protected judicial resources and integrity-and
yet one narrower than current Rule 606(b). The core concern of exclusion, in
this instance, is to prevent lengthy and complex hearings that reconstruct exten-
sive jury deliberations, merely because of a random and relatively harmless inap-
propriate remark. Such a competency rule, however, should not exclude matters
that pervade the jury's deliberations with serious distractions from the evidence
or the charge, whether they originate outside or inside the jury room. Nor
should this exclusionary principle be used in an indirect attempt to regulate jury
interrogation or to assure verdict stability; instead, those concerns should be
addressed directly, by uniform rules of jury interrogation and by specific princi-
ples governing when new trials are required.
205. The allegations in Tanner did "not suffice to bring this case under the common-law excep-
tion allowing postverdict inquiry when an extremely strong showing of incompetency has been
made." Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750; see also United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.)
("But absent ... substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency, courts have been
unwilling to subject a juror to a hearing on his mental condition merely on the allegations and
opinions of a losing party."), cert denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
206. See Government of V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917
(1976); United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907
(1959); Carlson & Sumberg, supra note 20, at 274 ("The authors urge, however, that creative state
evidence committees consider an additional exception: A juror may impeach his own verdict by
proving that a threat or act of violence was brought to bear on him to reach that verdict.").
207. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION COMMITrEE ON RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A FRESH REVIEW
AND EVALUATION AT RULE 606(B) (1988) (Rothstein Report).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56 (outlining adoption of Mansfield Rule by state
courts and development of Iowa Rule).
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These considerations suggest that juror testimony should be incompetent
unless it relates to overt matters that authoritatively inject facts not contained in
the evidence, or principles of decision not within the applicable law, into the
jury's deliberation. Mere speculation about the existence of an unsupported fact,
or a random improper remark that other jurors do not acknowledge, would not
meet this test. The requirement of Rule 606(b) that the information be extrane-
ous embodies in part this concept of authoritativeness. "Extraneous" informa-
tion implies there is a concrete identifiable source that is more likely to be
harmful, as opposed to juror speculation, which should not be cognizable in a
motion for a new trial. The use of a law dictionary in the courtroom, containing
different nuances from those in the charge, may or may not be considered extra-
neous if used within the jury room itself, but it has significant potential for harm,
principally because of its authoritativeness. Similarly, the concern over im-
proper influences on jurors is not merely whether such influences come from
within the jury room or without; instead, the concern is over whether the threat
or inducement is of a kind that is likely to have a serious and improper effect on
the average juror. The notion of "outside" influence, again, is tangentially re-
lated to this concern. Bribes or threats are more likely to come from third par-
ties than from fellow jurors; but, if a verdict results from serious offers by jurors
to do violence on their fellow jurors or to give them bribes, such evidence should
not be excluded merely because it occurs inside the jury room.
These considerations suggest a reformulation of Rule 606(b) that would al-
low examination of misconduct involving the injection of "authoritative infor-
mation seriously conflicting with the law or the facts in the case." This phrase
would be used as an aid in interpreting the current requirement of extraneous
information.20 9 Similarly, this Article suggests that evidence about improper
influences should be examined if it purports to demonstrate a kind of influence
that is "likely to affect the average juror seriously and in a substantially im-
proper way."'12 10 This formula would help to interpret the requirement, in cur-
209. Under this definition, the following examples of juror misconduct would probably be con-
sidered admissible if, in the trial court's opinion, they could have seriously affected the verdict:
(1) Jurors taking unauthorized evidence or other sources of extra-record information
into the jury room;
(2) Jurors conducting unauthorized experiments that do not include a reasonable ex-
amination of evidence already admitted;
(3) Jurors making investigations on their own outside the courtroom;
(4) Jurors reading about the case through news media accounts; or
(5) Jurors relating specific and personally acquired knowledge concerning the case or
the parties to other jurors.
210. Under this definition, the following types of jury misconduct would probably be considered
admissible if, in the trial court's opinion, they could have seriously affected the verdict:
(1) Contact, other than casual, between jurors and third parties other than court per-
sonnel by witnesses, or other persons seeking to influence their verdict;
(2) Contact, other than casual or in the lawful discharge of official duties, by court
personnel, including the judge, bailiff, attorneys, or other court functionaries or
their agents, seeking to influence them in an unlawful manner;
(3) Collective juror intoxication;
(4) Offers to bribe a juror; or
(5) Threats against a juror by another juror or a third party.
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rent Rule 606(b), of an outside influence.
Interestingly, this proposed revision of Rule 606(b) appears to bear some
resemblance to the reasoning of federal courts when they have construed the
Rule, although the resemblance is fragmentary. In Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Gereau,211 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held juror testimony competent to the extent that it reported spe-
cific threats from identifiable outside entities, but the court excluded considera-
tion of a more diffuse rumor that jurors were unable to attribute to a specific
source. The court undertook this analysis in an effort to construe the meaning of
the phrase, "improper outside influence"; however, the true thrust of the court's
reasoning was to consider whether the nature of the improper influence was such
that it was likely to affect the typical juror in a serious way. More recently, the
Supreme Court in Tanner disallowed evidence of impairment of jurors' reason-
ing faculties by alcohol and drugs, but left open the possibility that serious intox-
ication, to the point of "incompetency," might require the setting aside of a
verdict. 2 12 Analysis of whether the influence was outside or inside the jury
room was unrelated to the amount of alcohol and drugs consumed, and would
produce the same result irrespective of whether the jury was collectively and
deeply intoxicated or whether a single juror was slightly tipsy. The Court ac-
knowledged, in fact, that it is the "nature of the allegation" that controls, rather
than the location from which the information or influence originates. 2 13 Thus,
although the Court reached its result by a purported construction of Rule
606(b), it actually did so by an analysis that incorporates some features of the
one proposed in this Article.
This result in the decisions gives rise to the speculation that sound interpre-
tation of Rule 606(b), rather than its revision, might be all that would be neces-
sary to bring the law into harmony with the underlying policies. The difficulty,
however, is that Gereau and Tanner are ambiguous guides to the lower courts
because they purport to be based on the words of the Rule rather than on an
analysis similar to the one this Article proposes-an analysis that more closely
effectuates proper underlying policies. Furthermore, the broad exclusion in
Tanner-which extended not only to any presentation of evidence but also to
any further investigation-is difficult to accept, even if the narrow holding can be
justified on the ground that consideration of the available information did not
warrant a new trial. This outcome should have been reached by a rule denying a
new trial, rather than by an exclusionary principle that forbids even the inquiry
when such lurid evidence of misconduct exists. For all of these reasons, a minor
revision of the Rule-perhaps a requirement that the court consider the factors
here suggested whenever it distinguishes outside from inside misconduct-
would improve its enforcement in the lower courts, as would definitive Supreme
Court interpretation along these lines.
211. 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
212. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750.
213. Id. at 2746.
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C. Uniform and Effective Rules to Reduce Juror Harassment
and Verdict Instability
The revision of Rule 606(b) suggested above would tailor it to the purposes
that should be accomplished by a rule of exclusion. Specifically, it will prevent
the waste of judicial resources on minor allegations of misconduct. By excluding
juror testimony unless it meets such standards, such a revision will reduce the
threat to judicial integrity that might otherwise be produced by the acknowl-
edgement of misconduct on which the court refuses to act because of its minor
effect. This revision also will have some effect on the prevention of juror harass-
ment, because attorneys will be less motivated to question jurors persistently
about relatively minor misconduct. Likewise, it will serve the goal of verdict
stability by excluding the possibility of new trials based on less than egregious
misconduct. However, the proposed revision of the exclusionary principle will
not serve these policies as they should be served. Nor should it; the point is that
the policies cannot be served adequately by a mere exclusionary rule.
Instead, these policies should be addressed by rules of procedure. To the
extent it is deemed necessary, a uniform rule of jury investigation should be
enacted, 214 and it should be supplemented by local rules congenial to the
method of operation of local judges and workable in the context of the local bar.
At a minimum, it seems appropriate for Congress to adopt Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure preventing juror interviews, except as authorized
by the court, and providing the court with clear authority to regulate the sub-
jects and manner of investigation. In addition, it may be wise to impose a re-
quirement of good cause, which by implication means that the attorney must
begin with some indication of misconduct or improper influence rather than
with the hope that a "fishing expedition" will uncover a problem. Such a stan-
dard seems preferable to unguided discretion, which resulted in a prohibition of
inquiry in Tanner. Finally, to the extent a revised Rule 606(b) and rules regulat-
ing jury interviews do not protect jury stability, that policy goal should be ad-
dressed by rules requiring a showing of egregious misconduct coupled with
either presumed harm or ashowing of actual harm. This standard can be imple-
mented by evolution from current decisional law.
214. The uniform rule of jury investigation should prohibit an attorney, a party, or anyone act-
ing on their behalf from contacting a juror by any means. If a juror sua sponte contacts the attorney
for the losing party, the winning party, or anyone who could act in their interests, the attorney when
he receives the information should be required to make a written application to the court, with
formal notice to opposing counsel, stating the grounds for the alleged misconduct and requesting the
court to grant permission for further investigation. If an attorney comes into possession of informa-
tion concerning juror misconduct other than from a juror and he wishes to contact members of thejury for further investigation, he should likewise be required to make a written application to the
court. On formal notice to opposing counsel, the court should conduct a hearing.
The court should not grant an attorney the right to interview jurors except for good cause
shown. "Fishing expeditions" or a desire to improve trial technique should not be grounds for
interviewing jurors. If the court believes that good cause has been demonstrated, it should have wide
discretion to determine what form the interview might take. The court might require, for example,
that the interview be conducted on the record in open court with opposing counsel present, by
written questions approved of by the court in advance, or by any other method the court believes will
prevent juror harassment.
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CONCLUSION
Exclusionary rules are useful for ensuring reliability of evidence or prevent-
ing waste or distraction of a court's time. When they are used, however, for
other collateral purposes their effectiveness decreases, and a point is rapidly
reached at which their costs exceed their benefits. So it is with Rule 606(b).
The policy choices it embodies are obscured by the language of the Rule, and
many of its purported objectives are better addressed by existing alternatives.
Indeed, the costs of the Rule would in many cases outweigh its advantages if the
Supreme Court had not used principles outside its language to interpret it. This
expedient, however, has the disadvantage of obscuring the governing principles.
An exclusionary rule that would free the courts from hearing and deciding
new trial claims based on relatively minor misconduct is justified. Thus, the
principle embodied in Rule 606(b) should be retained. It should be reformu-
lated, however, to permit examination both of authoritative injection of informa-
tion inconsistent with the evidence or law, whether or not it is "extraneous," and
influences that would likely affect the typical juror in a seriously improper way,
whether they originate inside or outside the jury room. The remaining concerns
of juror harassment, improper postverdict persuasion, and verdict stability
should be addressed directly through a uniform rule governing jury investigation
and grants of new trials. In fact, these recommendations may coincide to some
degree with the manner in which courts are now interpreting Rule 606(b).
However, the modest revision suggested here would be preferable, because if the
current language of the Rule remains in place, it continually will distract from
the Rule's objectives.
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